顾宾:全球南方需要国际货币基金组织提供更多选择

公路美学

导读
10月22日，北京外国语大学法学副教授、中国论坛特约专家顾宾在美国《国家利益》杂志发表评论文章“The Global South Needs More Options From the IMF”。顾宾认为，国际货币基金组织(IMF)的特别提款权信托基金只是穷国的一种选择，但其他选择却很少受到关注。这种情况应当改变，以利于全球南方国家的发展。中国论坛特此翻译，以飨读者。

在10月16日召开的国际货币基金组织（IMF）年会上，继去年8月历史性的特别提款权（SDR）分配之后，又见证了一个为特别提款权再分配而设立的重要信托基金——韧性和可持续性信托（RST）开始运作。然而，13个多月过去了，6500亿美元的特别提款权分配中无一转借低收入国家，这有违分配的初衷，即帮助贫穷和脆弱国家对抗新冠疫情和债务困扰。

特别提款权可以兑换特别提款权货币篮子里的五种硬通货币中的任何一种：美元、欧元、人民币、日元和英镑。神奇之处在于，特别提款权是大笔一挥创造出来的。这样一笔意外之财，可以满足IMF成员进口疫苗和个人防护用品的流动性需求、偿还外债、或者仅仅缓冲其现有储备资产。使用特别提款权的唯一条件就是保持其储备资产地位。
根据国际货币基金组织的法律，各国有权按照其在国际货币基金组织的份额比例获得特别提款权——谁拥有的配额多，谁就能得到更多。因此，七国集团（G7）国家获得了近乎一半的新拨款，而七十多个低收入国家仅获得了3%。面临如此严重的不平衡，找到使富国自愿将特别提款权再转借给穷国的可行方法已然成为首要事宜。
国际货币基金组织已有两个信托基金用于特别提款权的转借使用。一个是减贫与增长信托基金（PRGT），专门向指定的低收入国家提供贷款，主要用于短期国际收支需要。另一个即是本文开篇提及的韧性和可持续性信托基金（RST），作为历史悠久的PRGT的补充。这一信托基金的对象国扩大到所有中低收入国家，用来协助其应对长期的结构性挑战，如应对气候变化和防控大流行病疫情。

除国际货币基金组织之外，还有两个办法可以让特别提款权进入再分配。一种是通过多边开发银行（MDBs）。例如，在全球危机中资产负债表紧张的非洲开发银行，迫切需要提高其贷款能力，要么通过借用富国的特别提款权并将其转为贷款，要么使用特别提款权以增强其资本基础。另一种是将特别提款权从富国直接转借给穷国，免去任何金融中介的途径。
遗憾的是，由于遭到欧洲中央银行和国际货币基金组织本身的强烈反对，国际货币基金组织之外的再分配选择很少被讨论。反对者的理由是，特别提款权的储备资产性质不允许其被用于发展目的。然而，这种过时的观念应当改变。
根据定义，储备资产是现成的、具有高流动性和信用质量的。然而，该定义一直在演变，鉴于中央银行的外汇储备经常被用于投资3A级以下的政府债券，甚至是私企债券，储备资产的特征逐渐变得相对而非绝对。这些投资被认为保留了其储备资产的特性，特别提款权贷款资源也应被视为等同如此，包括可用于发展目的的资源。
在国际货币基金组织以外的两种模式中，特别提款权的储备资产地位，可通过技术上利用兑现系统以及通过国际货币基金组织的两个信托基金提供的为保持特别提款权贷款的流动性和稳健性而设计的储备和存款账户，来实现良好维持。事实上，富国很少（如果有的话）需要将其特别提款权兑现，更不用提那些发行可自由使用货币的国家了。
反对在国际货币基金组织之外重新分配特别提款权的一个不为人知的理由是政治上的，也是难以启齿的：更多的选择导致更激烈的竞争。国际货币基金组织的贷款是有条件的，要求借款人进行政策调整以换取资助，这不仅被指责为基本上不可行，同时属于过度干涉。新的韧性和可持续性信托基金（RST）声称没有附加条件，但仍然要求借款国进行与IMF计划相一致的政策改革。有了更多的选择，国际货币基金组织的模式对借款国的吸引力可能会降低。
自去年新一轮特别提款权分配后，20国集团承诺转借1000亿美元的特别提款权。除去其他捐助者，仅中国就承诺将100亿美元的特别提款权转借给非洲国家，占中国配额的23%。减贫与增长信托基金（PRGT）和韧性和可持续性信托基金（RST）已经为这些转借做好准备，但为了充分实现特别提款权分配的目的和全球发展中国家的福祉，开放更多渠道方为最佳选择。

翻译：中国论坛 王妍妍

核译：许馨匀 张立荣

图源：《国家利益》

Gu Bin: The Global South Needs More Options From the IMF
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meeting on October 16 witnessed the operationalization of a major trust fund, the Resilient and Sustainable Trust (RST), established for the purpose of special drawing right (SDR) reallocation, following a historic SDR allocation in August last year. Yet, over thirteen months have passed, and no single SDR out of the allocation of $650 billion has yet been recycled to a low-income country, depressing the original motive of the allocation to help poor and vulnerable countries combat Covid-19 and debt distress.
SDR may be exchanged for any of the five hard currencies in the SDR basket: the U.S. dollar, euro, Chinese renminbi, Japanese yen, and British pound. What is magical is that SDR was created with the stroke of a pen. With such a windfall, IMF members may meet liquidity needs to import vaccines and PPEs, repay external debts, or simply buffer their existing reserves. The only condition of the SDR use is to preserve its reserve asset status.
Under IMF law, countries are entitled to SDRs in proportion to their quotas in the IMF—whoever has shall be given more. Therefore, the G7 countries received almost half of the new allocation, while the seventy-plus low-income countries only received 3 percent. With such a deep disequilibrium, finding viable voluntary recycling methods from the rich to the poor has become paramount.
The IMF has two trust funds ready for SDR recycling. One is the Poverty-Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), which lends exclusively to designated low-income countries and mainly for short-term balance of payments needs. The other is the RST, mentioned at the beginning of this piece, to complement the time-honored PRGT. This fund expands to serve all low- and middle-income countries and to meet longer-term structural challenges, such as climate change and pandemic preparedness.
There are two other SDR recycling choices outside of the IMF. One is to recycle through multilateral development banks (MDBs). The African Development Bank, for example, which has a strained balance sheet amid global crises, badly needs to enhance its lending capacity, either by borrowing rich countries’ SDRs and on- lending them or by using the SDRs to enhance its capital base. The other is to recycle the SDRs directly from rich countries to the poor, waiving the route of any financial intermediary.
Regrettably, recycling choices outside of the IMF have received little discussion due to major opposition from the European Central Bank and the IMF itself. Those opponents’ argument is that the reserve-asset nature of SDR does not allow it to be used for development purposes. This ideology, however, is old-fashioned and should be changed.
By definition, a reserve asset is readily available with high liquidity and credit quality. However, the definition has been evolving, and the reserve asset’s characteristic gets rather more relative than absolute, given that central banks’ foreign reserves are often seen to be invested in below-3A government bonds, and even in private corporate bonds. Those investments are considered to have preserved their reserve-asset character; the same should hold for SDR loan resources, including for development purposes.
In both outside-IMF modalities, the reserve asset status of the SDRs may be well maintained by technically drawing upon the encashment system and the reserve and deposit accounts designed to preserve the liquidity and soundness of the SDR lending through both IMF trust funds. Indeed, rarely, if ever, do rich countries need to encash their SDR claims, let alone those issuing freely usable currencies.
An untold reason for opposing the SDR reallocation beyond the IMF is political and difficult: more options bring more competition. The IMF lends with conditionality, imposing policy adjustments upon borrowers in exchange for financial resources, which is criticized as largely unworkable while overly intrusive. The new RST, claiming no conditionality, still requests a concurrent IMF program and policy reforms by the borrowing country. With more choices available, the IMF model can be less appealing to borrowers.
Following the new SDR allocation last year, the G20 committed to recycling $100 billion in SDRs. Among other donors, China alone promised to recycle $10 billion in SDRs to African countries, accounting for 23 percent of its allocation. PRGT and RST are ready for such recycling, but opening more channels is optimal for fully realizing the purposes of the SDR allocation, and for the welfare of the Global South.

Gu Bin is an associate law professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University and China Forum expert.

This article was first published on The National Interest on Oct. 22, 2022.

作者：清华大学战略与安全研究中心